We study the design of decision making mechanism for resource allocations over a multi-agent system in a dynamic environment. Agents' privately observed preference over resources evolves over time and the population is dynamic due to adoption of stopping rules. The proposed model designs the rules of encounter for agents participating in the dynamic mechanism by specifying an allocation rule and three payment rules to elicit agents' coupled decision makings of honest preference reporting and optimal stopping over multiple periods. The mechanism provides a special posted-price payment rule that depends only on each agent's realized stopping time to directly influence the population dynamics. This letter focuses on the theoretical implementability of the rules in perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium and characterizes necessary and sufficient conditions to guarantee agents' honest equilibrium behaviors over periods. We provide the design principles to construct the payments in terms of the allocation rules and identify the restrictions of the designer's ability to influence the population dynamics. The established conditions make the designer's problem of finding multiple rules to determine an optimal allocation rule. arXiv:2003.03173v1 [eess.SY] 
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent sequential decision making is an important research agenda in engineering (e.g., [1] ), economics (e.g., [2] ), and Artificial Intelligence (AI) (e.g., [3] ). In many scenarios, agents act on behalf of individuals or organizations and the multi-agent system needs to represent their preferences, embody the knowledge about the environment, and behave according to their rationality in decision makings. Mechanism design approaches have been used to design the rules of encounters for the multi-agent systems to elicit actions, allocate resources, manage the cooperation, and rule the competition in heterogeneous environment where each agent is self-interested (e.g., [4] , [5] ).
This letter considers a dynamic multi-agent resource allocation mechanism, in which there is one central planner (CP) that aims to allocate resources periodically to agents based on their private preferences. The mechanism is characterized by an allocation rule and three payment rules that specify allocation and payment to each agent at each period based on their preference. The multiple self-interested agents strategically report their preferences to the CP and choose a time to stop over periods. Each agent's preference evolves over time due to the learning-by-doing, which captures the effects of experiences (i.e., historical preferences and allocations) on agent's preference. The population is dynamic due to agent's stochastic departure by the adoption of the stopping rule. † To directly influence the population dynamics, one of the payment rules is a posted-price rule that depends only on the realized stopping time of each agent.
We are interested in a class of direct mechanisms in which agents are incentivized to truthfully report their true preferences (i.e., incentive compatibility) and focus on the theoretical implementability of the mechanism when each agent strategically makes the reporting and the stopping decisions simultaneously. Revelation principle allows the CP to focus on the direct mechanisms to replicate equilibrium outcomes of indirect mechanisms (see, e.g., [6] ). Agents' adoption of stopping rule, however, complicates the guarantee of implementability in the dynamic environment due to the coupling of agents' reporting strategy and stopping decision in the strategic reasoning about their self interests. The consideration of behavior elicitations when each agent makes simultaneous multiple decisions that depend on their private information over periods distinguishes this work from other mechanism design problems that consider only the reporting decisions (e.g., [7] , [8] ) and optimal stopping problems that involve no truthful revealing of private information (e.g., [9] , [10] ).
We introduce the notion of honesty elicitation (HE) constraint that guarantees the incentive compatibility and elicits optimal stopping behaviors of agents. The honesty of the reporting can obviate agents' strategic reasoning and simplify the dynamic decision makings. At each period, the HE constraint requires a guarantee of no profitable deviations from honesty at current period as well as agents' planned future behaviors. This multi-dimensional analysis is simplified by establishing a one-shot deviation principle that provides necessity and sufficiency of single-period truthfulness to imply multi-period honesty. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions to guarantee the implementability of the HE constraint in perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE-HI) and propose design principles to construct the payment rules in terms of the allocation rule. Despite its independence of agent' preference, we observe that the ability of the CP to control the population dynamics is limited due to the design restrictions of the posted-price payment rule in PBNE-HI mechanism.
II. MODEL
We are interested in multi-agent sequential decisionmaking problems, in which self-interested agents wants to obtain resource that is allocated by a third party, called central planner (CP, she). We consider a dynamic population environment, in which the population evolves over time due to each agent's local decision of whether to continue or not by adopting an optimal stopping rule. The resource is allocated among the agents periodically. Time is discrete and indexes by t ∈ T = {0, . . . , T }. Suppose there are n agents entering the resource allocation model. Let I = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agent indices. The CP is indexed as agent 0.
Information structure. The information structure of the environment is described by a tuple < X, F 0 >. Here, X = × i∈I,t∈T X i,t is the joint set of agent's preferences, with
as the period-t set of agent i's preference, and F 0 = {F i,0 } i∈I is the set of distributions of agent's initial preferences. We assume that each agent's preference is independent from each other at each period. Each agent i's period-t preference x i,t is his own private information that is unobservable to all other agents and the CP. Each agent i (he) report his period-t preference by using a reporting strategy, α i,t :
is reported to the CP given x i,t as his true preference. Meanwhile, agent i decides whether to stop immediately or continue by adopting a stopping time rule ζ i , which will be elaborated later in the letter. Notationally, let
Take-it-or-leave-it. At the ex-ante stage, i.e., prior to period t = 0, the CP provides a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agents by specify allocation rules and payments rules. The CP's mechanism is described by a tuple < σ σ σ , ρ ρ ρ, γ γ γ, β β β >. Let A = × i∈I,t∈T A i,t is the joint set of resource available to all agents, where A i,t as the period-t set of resources available to agent i. Here, σ σ σ = {σ i,t } i∈I,t∈T : X → A is the joint allocation rule, where σ i,t : X i,t × X −i,t → A i,t is the period-t local allocation rule for agent i, such that a i,t = σ i,t (x i,t ,x −i,t ) is the period-t resource allocated to agent i when he reportsx i,t and other agents reportx −i,t .
is paid to agent i when he decides not to stop at period t, given his reportx i,t and other agents'x −i,t . γ γ γ = {γ i,t } i∈I,t∈T : X → R n×T is the preference-dependent terminal payment rule, where γ i,t : X i,t ×X −i,t → R gives period-t payment if agent i decides to continue given his reportx i,t and others'x −i,t . Finally, β β β = {β i,t } i∈I,t∈T : T n → R n is joint posted-price terminal payment, which depends only on the realized stopping times of agents. Hence, if agent i decides to stop at period t, he receives a payment p i,t = γ i,t (x i,t ,x −i,t )+β i,t (t), when he reportsx i,t and othersx −i,t . Since all the agents stop at the final period T , we make β i,T = 0, for all i ∈ I, t ∈ T. For simplicity, let σ σ σ t = {σ i,t } i∈I , ρ i = {σ i,t } t∈T , and σ t i = {σ i,s } t s=0 ; ρ, γ, and β can be treated analogously. Also, let
and p i,t can be treated analogously.
Learning-by-doing. Each agent updates his preference at the beginning of each period due to his learning-by-doing that leads to stochastic dynamics of the preference. The environment is dynamic due to agents' learning-by-doing and the population dynamics We assume that the dynamics of agent i's preference is governed by a Markovian stochastic process uniquely characterized by the allocation rule σ i , his reporting strategies α i , and a set of transition kernels
Given any x t i (i.e., history x t−1 i and current x i,t ), we define agent i's interim process Γ i,t [σ i , α i , K i ; x t i ] that consists of t periods of deterministic preferences, i.e., x t i and stochastic process starting from t + 1 uniquely defined by σ i , α i , K i , and x t i . Let Γ Γ Γ[σ σ σ , α α α, K K K] and Γ Γ Γ t [σ σ σ , α α α, K K K; x x x t ] denote the joint stochastic process and joint period-t interim process, respectively. Let ω i,t be uniformly distributed from (0, 1). Let κ i,t be defined as follows:
Letx i,t denote the random variable and x i,t is on sample of x i,t and defineω i,t . analogously Hence, the dynamics of x i,t can be described by the function κ i,t as, given x i,t−1 and
i.e., if ω i,t is uniformly distributed over (0, 1), thenx i,t is distributed according to K i,t (x i,t−1 , a i,t−1 ). The other factor that causes the dynamics is due to the population evolution. This is because each agent is allowed to leave the system by adopting a stopping rule, which leads to a weakly decreasing population. At each period, each agent i decides whether to stop or not at each period after obtaining his current preference. The agent sends his stopping decision to the CP alongside with his report. Conventions. To describe the dynamic population, we introduce a set of agent indices, I = × t∈T I t , where each I t = {1, . . . , n t }, with 1 ≤ n t ≤ n 0 = n, is the set of periodt participating agent indices. Let e t represent general agent index in I t and let i t ∈ I t denote agent i' (i ∈ I 0 = I) period-t index. To simplify the notation, we omit the time index t in subscript, e.g.,
We only show the allocation rule σ and reporting strategy α, i.e., E ·|α i , σ i , to represent the expectation taken under the process Γ i,t [σ , α, K i ; x t i ]. Expectations from other processes can be denoted analogously.
III. DECISION-MAKING MODEL
Let τ τ τ t = {τ e t } e t ∈I t be any joint set of time horizon of agents participating at period t. Let u i t : X i t × A i t be the instantaneous utility (utility) function such that u i t (x i t , a i t ) gives the period-t utility of agent i t , given his true preference x i t , reportx i t , and other agents' reportsx −i t . Define the period-t interim expected payoff of agent i, given α i , < σ i , ρ i >, and the interim process Γ i,t , as follows
wherex s = {x i s , {x e s } e s ∈I s \{i s } }. Similarly, we can define the ex-ante expected payoff of agent i, given α i , < σ i , ρ i , γ i , β >, and the stochastic process Γ i , as
The reasoning process for the agents induced by the mechanism and the dynamic environment can be characterized by an incomplete-information game. In this game, an agent only observes his preference by himself and reports it only to the CP. Each agent i's period-t knowledge about other agents' preference is based on his realized allocations a t i and the priors about the stochastic of others' preferences, i.e., F −i,0 and K −i . In this work, we consider a direct mechanism (e.g., [11] ), in which each agent i finds it is his best interest to report his preference truthfully at each period t, i.e.,
The solution concept for the game is perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE), in which each agent reports truthfully at each period given the belief that all other agents report truthfully. Let b i t :
as the corresponding density function. Let α * i = {α * i t } be agent i's truthful reporting strategy, i.e., α * i t (x i t ) = x i t , for all
Definition 1. (PBNE) Given the mechanism < σ σ σ , ρ ρ ρ, γ γ γ, β β β >, the game of the agents admits a PBNE if, for all
and the belief b i t is updated according Bayes' rule by receiving < x i t , a i t >, i.e.,
where x −i t−1 and a i t−1 in the update of b i t are the estimated by agent i. When the denominator of (6) become 0, µ i t+1 (x −i t+1 |x i t , a i t ) is updated by assigning any possible value.
Since each agent's preference is independently distributed within each period, agent i can have a belief about each other individual agent's preference based on Bayes' rule in the similar way.
A. Optimal Stopping
Fix a truthful α * i . For the convenience of notations, we omit the dependence on the reporting strategy when an agent reports truthfully, e.g.,
Define
Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Backward induction yields,
Let the stopping rule ζ i t be defined as
It has been shown that the stopping rule (9) is optimal (see, e.g., Theorem 1.9 of [12]), i.e., it solves problem (7) . By ζ * i , we denote the optimal stopping rule given in (9) .
B. PBNE Honestly Implementable
To successfully elicit agents' honest behaviors that admit a PBNE, we require an honesty elicitation (HE) constraint that (1) guarantees incentive compatibility and (2) maintains optimality of stopping rule. We define the implementability of our mechanism in the following definition.
Definition 2.
(PBNE-HI) The mechanism < σ σ σ , ρ ρ ρ, γ γ γ, β β β > satisfies PBNE-honesty implementable (PBNE-HI) if, for all reporting strategy α i , all i t ∈ I t , t ∈ T, the following honesty elicitation (HE) constraint is satisfied:
, and each agent believes that all other agents report truthfully all the time with probability 1 and updates his belief according to (6) .
The condition (10) captures the coupling of each agent i' reporting decision and stopping decision. It elicits truthful reporting strategy α * i that is optimal at every period t and the optimal stopping behavior according to ζ * i . That is, the condition (10) imposes that it is each agent i's best interest to report truthfully at every period and make stopping decisions according to ζ * i . Given the mechanism rules, agent i's decision makings at each period t to maximizing C i t requires the evaluation of future payoffs, which is determined by his current reporting strategy, his planned future reporting strategies, and the time horizon τ i t . One the one hand, any
On the other hand, any time horizon τ i t ∈ T t can pin down (a set of) optimal reporting strategy
Additionally, agent i's current reporting strategy α i t directly determines the immediate payoff and also indirectly affects the distribution of his future preferences which influence the expected future payoffs through the given mechanism rules. Hence, condition (10) requires multi-dimensional guarantees.
Letα i,(t) = {α i s } s∈T be any reporting strategy that differs from α * i only at period-t, (see it as one-shot deviation reporting strategy at period t) i.e.,α i s = α * i s , for all s ∈ T\{t}. To emphasize the one shot deviation, in the rest of this letter we usex i t =α i t (x t ) to denote the adoption ofα i,(t) unless otherwise stated. We simplify the condition (10) by establishing a one-shot deviation principle.
At each period t, agent i's reasoning about choosing stopping time characterized by a stopping rule is independent of the reporting strategy; however, the stopping decision according to ζ * i is coupled with the current reporting strategy. Let
it is optimal for agent i to stop at t given his true preference x i t and period-t reporting strategy α i t . Hence, for a given stopping rule, agent i's any reporting strategy α i t has an associated τ * i t (x i t ; α i t ) for each observed preference x i t and the optimal reporting strategy α i t is given as,
. HE constraint elicits the truthful reporting α * i and optimal stopping rule ζ * i as the optimal decision rules for each agent i in any PBNE-HI mechanism. The analysis in the rest of this letter will focus on one-shot deviation report strategies.
C. Threshold Rule
Next, we introduce an important class of stopping rules that is based on a threshold rule (see, e.g., [13] , [14] ). Define, for all τ i ∈ T t+1 ,
with
From the definition of the optimal stopping rule ζ * i , we can define a stopping region as follows:
We consider the following assumptions.
Assumption 2. The difference of expected payoff between stopping at the next period t + 1 and at the current period t,
The following lemma states the monotonicity property of g i t .
Let ε i : T → X i t be the threshold function, such that agent i t decides to stop at period t if x i t ≤ ε i (t). Since all agents stop at the final period T , we make ε i (T ) =x i t . The optimal threshold (stopping) rule is defined as follows:
We establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumption 3 holds. In PBNE-HI mechanism < σ σ σ , ρ ρ ρ, γ γ γ, β β β >, each agent i's optimal stopping rule is a threshold rule, i.e., ζ i = ζ ε i with a unique threshold function ε i , for all i ∈ I.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 2 implies that the threshold function ε i can be characterized by the posted-price rule β i , and vice versa. The following lemma follows Proposition 2.
Lemma 2. Fix truthful α * i . Given α i , ρ i , and β i , we have β i t (t) = g i t (ε i (t); σ i ).
Lemma 2 is based on the monotonicity of g i t and the stopping region defined in (14) .
D. CP's Problem
The CP's design problem requires the estimation of population dynamics. Without loss of generality, we assume the indices in I t are ordered according to the magnitude of τ * e t (x e t ) given in (12) . Specifically, let e t , e t ∈ I t . Then, e t < e t if τ * e t (x e t ) > τ * e t (x e t ). When τ * e t (x e t ) = τ * e t (x e t ), the relative order is determined according to the order in the previous period. For simplicity, we introduce the index mapping π t : I t−1 → I t such that i t = π t (i t−1 ) based on the aforementioned ordering rules. If agent e t leaves at t, then π t (e t ) ∈ I t+1 . Let τ τ τ * = {τ * i } i∈I denote the mean first passage time or expected stopping time evaluated at the ex-ante stage. The calculation of τ τ τ * = {τ * i } i∈I is beyond the scope of this letter and interested reader may refer to e.g., [15] . Let I S t ≡ {i t ∈ I t : π t+1 (i t ) ∈ I t+1 } (i.e., set of period-t leaving agents), IS t ≡ I t \I S t , and T \τ τ τ ≡ T max τ τ τ \τ τ τ for any set τ τ τ ∈ T n t .
Furthermore, denote x S t ≡ {x i t } i t ∈I S t and xS t = x t \x S t . The CP's design problem is to maximize the following constrained expected payoff at ex-ante by determining < σ σ σ , ρ ρ ρ, γ γ γ, β β β >:
where (PC), which stands for participation constraint, incentivizes agents to participate. In the following section, we characterize the PBNE-HI and provide design principle for honesty elicitation rules.
IV. CHARACTERIZING THE HONESTY ELICITATION
In this section, we characterize the honesty elicitation constraint of PBNE-HI given in (11) . First, we introduce the notion of distance function, defined as follows: for any
and, for any
where the superscripts S andS represent stop and non-stop, respectively. Basically, the distance function d S i t (y i t , x i t ; σ i ) (resp. dS i t (y i t , x i t ;τ i t , σ i )) represents the change in agent i's expected utilities if he keeps reporting y i t when his true preferences are y i t and x i t , and he stops at period t (resp. plan to stop at τ i t in the future).
Let φ S i t (·|σ i ) : X i t → R and φS i t (·|σ i ) : X i t → R be the characterizing functions of agent i that are modeled by the allocation rule σ i . Construct the preference-dependent payment rules < ρ i , γ i > in terms of the characterizing functions as follows:
We obtain a sufficient condition for PBNE-HI in the following proposition. Proposition 3. Let ρ i t and γ i t be constructed in (19) and (20), respectively. The mechanism < σ σ σ , ρ ρ ρ, γ γ γ, β β β > is PBNE-HI if the characterizing functions satisfying the following conditions: for all x i t , y i t ∈ X i t , i t ∈ I t , and t ∈ T,
where
Proof. See Appendix D.
The sufficient condition established in Proposition 3 does not involve the design of the posted-price rule β i due to its independence from agent's preferences. However, it can be represented in terms of ρ i t and γ i t for each t through its relationship to ε i shown in Lemma 2. The following proposition shows the regular conditions for β i to maintain the honesty elicitation.
Proposition 4. Fix a σ i t . Given a threshold function ε i , in PBNE-HI mechanism β β β satisfies the following regular condition: for all i t ∈ I t , t ∈ T,
Proof. See Appendix E.
The regular condition (24) is independent of agent's private information. Since β i T (T ) = 0 for all i T ∈ I T , we can determine each β i t in terms of the characterization functions.
Define an auxiliary function
where 1 {·} is the indicator function.
We obtain a first-order condition for PBNE-HI in the following lemma. Lemma 3. In any PBNE-HI mechanism, each <
Proof. See Appendix F.
The following theorem establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for PBNE-HI. Theorem 1. Any mechanism < σ σ σ , ρ ρ ρ, γ γ γ, β β β > is PBNE-HI if and only if the ρ i t and γ i t are given in (19) and (20), respectively, and the characterizing functions satisfy, for any arbitrary fixed x δ i t ∈ X i t , all x i t ∈ X i t , any ε i , i t ∈ I t , t ∈ T,
and
Proof. See Appendix G.
The necessary and sufficient condition in Theorem 1 specifies the constructions of characterizing functions φ S i and φS i in terms of the allocation rule σ i . As a result, the payment rules ρ i and γ i can be crafted using σ i through (19) and (20), respectively. For the posted-price β i , its relationship to ε i can be characterized by σ i through the regular condition in Proposition 4. This regular condition provides a design guidance for the β i to directly influence agent i's realized stopping time. However, it also imposes restrictions on the design of β i in any PBNE-HI mechanism. The following proposition describes the design principle for β i .
Proposition 5. Fix a σ i . Suppose that φ S i and φS i are constructed in Theorem 1. Let r i = {r i 0 , . . . , r i T } ∈ R T +1 denote a sequence of posted-price payment specified by a
The following statements are true.
(1) The mechanism is PBNE-HI if and only if
(2) PBNE-HI can be maintained without offering β i if and only if there exists ε i that solves the following equation,
(3) Agent i can be elicited to stay till t = T if and only if
There is in general no global posted-price rule, i.e., β i = β for all i ∈ I, for heterogeneous agents that can prevent population dynamics; i.e., all agents stay till t = T .
Proof. See Appendix H.
A. Relaxation of CP's Problem
The necessary and sufficient condition in Theorem 1 enables the designs of payment rules in terms of allocation rules. For simplicity, let Π t :
For any x i t , x i t ∈ X i t with x i t ≤ x i t , x −i t ∈ X i t , and x i t+1 ∈ X i t+1 , t ∈ T\T , the following holds:
Lemma 4. Suppose u i t is non-decreasing in x i t , for all i t ∈ I t , t ∈ T and Assumption 3 holds. Then,
Lemma 4 specifies that J i t non-decreasing in x i t (by making left hand side of (26) non-negative), which implies the non-decreasing property of C i t , for all t ∈ T. Hence, guaranteeing the non-negative payoff for lowest preference x i t implies the PC constraint. Based on Lemma 4, CP's problem in problem (16) can be relaxed as follows:
The relaxed CP's problem (29) is the constrained dynamic programming and, in general, is analytically intractable. We put the design of computational algorithms to solve (29) in our future work.
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we have presented a dynamic mechanism design problem for resource allocation to multiple selfinterested agents in a dynamic environment due to agent's learning-by-doing and the adoption of stopping rules. The mechanism consists of an allocation rule and three payment rules. One of the payment rule that is independent of agents' private preference is used to directly influence the population dynamics. We have defined the notion of honesty elicitation to describe the scenario where each agent is incentivized to truthfully reveal his true preference to the central planner and follow an optimal stopping rule. Necessary and sufficient conditions are established for the implementability of honesty elicitation under the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Based on the achieved conditions, given an allocation rule, we have provided design principles for payment rules such that the designer's multi-variable optimization problem can be simplified to a single variable problem.
APPENDIX
Letx x x −i t and x x x −i t denote the preference (random variable) and its period-t realization of all agents other than agent i t .
A. Proof of Proposition 1
We omit the only if part that can be proved straightforwardly by following the optimality of honesty. We prove the if part by contradiction. Suppose that the truthful reporting strategy α * i satisfies (11) for any one-shot deviation reporting strategyα i,(t) at period t, but it does not satisfy (10) . This means that there exists another reporting strategy
i ] be the optimal stopping rules with α * i and α 1 i , respectively. Suppose that ζ * i [α * i ] calls for stopping at period t but ζ * i [α 1 i ] calls for continuing; i.e.
Then, we can find some η > 0 such that
i t } t∈T be any reporting strategy. Suppose that α 2 i s = α 1 i s , for all s ∈ T t,t+k , for some k > 0 and
Then, we have the following from (30) and (31):
Letᾱ i|t,t+k = {ᾱ i t } t∈T be any reporting strategy such that α i s = α 2 i s , for all s ∈ T t,t+k andᾱ i s = α * i s for all s ∈ T\T t,t+k , for some k > 0. From (32), we can see that usingᾱ i|t,t+k as a way to deviate from honesty is enough to gain profit.
Let α 3 i|s = {α 3 i t } t∈T be the one-shot deviation reporting strategy at period s ∈ T t,t+k , for k > 0, such that α 3 i s = α 2 i s . From (32), we have
Then, since α * i satisfy (11), we have
(38) Hence, we can use backward induction to obtain the following:
, which contradicts the fact that α * i satisfies (11). We can use the similar procedures for the following cases: those are (1) 
B. Proof of Lemma 1
is the change in agent i t 's expected payoffs between when he continues and plans to stop at t + 1 and he stops immediately at t. Then, agent i t 's period-t interim expected payoff can be represented in terms of M i t as follows:
(40) Hence, g i t in (13) can be rewritten as follows:
(41) Assumption 2 implies that M i t is non-decreasing in x i t , for all t ∈ T. Hence, (41) leads to that g i t is non-decreasing in x i t , for all t ∈ T.
C. Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose there exist two threshold function ε i = ε i . Let ζ ε i and ζ ε i be the optimal stopping rule in PBNE-HI with respect to ε i and ε i , respectively. As defined in (12) , let τ ε i t (x i t ) and τ ε i t (x i t ) be corresponding to ζ ε i and ζ ε i , respectively. Suppose
, for x i t ∈ X i t , t ∈ T. Assume without loss of generality ε i (t) < ε i (t) for some t ∈ T. Then, we have
where the interim process in the expectation are used to indicate the how the expectation is the measured. P r (τ ε i t (x i t ) = t) can be determined in the similar way. Hence,
However, since f i t (x i t ) > 0 for all x i t ∈ X i t , t ∈ T, the right hand side of (42) is non zero, which provides a contradiction.
D. Proof of Proposition 3
From the constructions of γ i t in (20), we can represent J S i t in terms of the characterizing functions as follows:
(45) From the definitions of the distance function d S i t in (17), we have
For JS i t , we first re-write it as follows:
The construction of ρ i t in (19) yields
R.H.S of (47)
= sup
(48) From the definition (18) and condition (23), we have R.H.S. of (48) = sup
Then, condition (22) yields R.H.S. of (49) ≤ φS i t (x i t ).
(50)
From the construction of ρ i t in (19) and condition (23), we have, for any τ i ∈ T t+1 ,
Combining (46) and (52), we can show that (11) is established.
E. Proof of Proposition 4
From Proposition 2, we know that each agent has a unique threshold rule with a unique function in any PBNE-HI mechanism < σ σ σ ρ ρ ρ, γ γ γ, β β β >. Lemma 2 gives the preferenceindependent relationship between β i t and g i t . By direct substituting the constructions of ρ i t and γ i t given in (19) and (20), respectively, we obtain (24).
F. Proof of Lemma 3
Due to the dynamics of agent's preference, current-period reporting of preference will influence the distribution of future preferences of that agent. Let x i t ∈ X i t and x i t+1 ∈ X i t+1 be any realized preferences in any two adjacent periods. From (2), we have that there exists ω i t+1 ∈ (0, 1) such that
(53) Applying the envelope theorem in PBNE-HI mechanism yields the following:
From the definition of κ i t in (1), we have
Similarly, for any sequence of realizations of preferences, < x t , x t+1 , . . . , x k , . . . x T >, we have, for any t < k ≤ T ,
In any PBNE-HI mechanism < σ σ σ , ρ ρ ρ, γ γ γ, b b be e et t ta a a >, truthful reporting strategy is optimal for all agents. Then, from the envelope theorem, we have
(57)
G. Proof of Theorem 1
It is easy to verify that the constructions of φ S i t and φS i t in (27) and (28), respectively, satisfy the sufficient conditions in Proposition 3. Hence, the sufficiency can be proved in the similar way as in Appendix (D), so we omit it here and focus on the necessity part.
1) Optimal stopping rule calls for stopping:
To simplify the notation, we omit other agents' preferences unless otherwise stated. Since the mechanism < σ σ σ , ρ ρ ρ, γ γ γ, β β β > is PBNE-HI, we have
Clearly, PBNE-HI implies that
. Then, the differentiability implies
From the envelope theorem, we have
Hence,
The definition of distance gives
2) Optimal stopping rule calls for continuing: x i t ≥ ε i t (t):: Similarly, PBNE-HI imples the following:
PBNE-HI implies
After applying the envelope to HS i t , we obtain the following:
By expanding g i t , we have R.H.S. of (61) = sup
(62) Let β i = min τ i ∈T t+1 β i (τ i ). Since β i T (T ) = 0 for all agent, then we have the following: R.H.S. of (62) ≥ sup
PBNE-HI implies R.H.S. of (63) ≥ sup
Hence, we obtain sup τ i t ∈T t+1 d S i t (x i t ,x i t ; τ i t , σ i ) ≤ φS i t (x i t |σ i ) − φS i t (x i t |σ i ).
H. Proof of Proposition 5 1) Statement (1) and (2): Fix a σ i . If the mechanism < σ σ σ , ρ ρ ρ, γ γ γ, β β β > is PBNE-HI, then any posted price sequence r i produced by β i with ε i satisfies r i ∈ R i [σ i , ε i ] due to the regular condition in Proposition 4.
For the converse direction, let β i be the rule for agent i in a PBNE-HI mechanism, with r i = β i (< 0, . . . , T >) and the corresponding unique threshold rule ε i . Suppose r i ∈ R i [σ i , ε i ], e.g.,
which implies that there exists some q > 0, such that β i t (t) + q = g i t (x i t ; σ i ).
(65) Suppose agent i's period-t realized preference is x i t ≤ ε i (t). Then truthful reporting and stopping immediately gives agent i the expected payoff C i t (x i t ,t; σ i ) = t−1 ∑ s=0 u i s (x i s , σ i s (x i s , x x x −i s )) + ρ i s (x i s , x x x −i s )) + u i t (x i t , σ i t (x i t , x x x −i t )) + γ i t (x i t , x x x −i t )) + β i t (t). From (65), we have
x x x −i t )) + g i t (x i t ; σ i ), which incentivizes agent i t to continue, which contradits the optimality of stopping rule.
Statement (2) can be proved by setting β i t (t) = 0 for all i t ∈ I t , t ∈ T.
2) Statement (3): To make all agents non-stop at all intermediate periods t ∈ T 0,T −1 , the posted-price payment rule β β β has to impose the threshold function ε i (t) =x i t , for all i t ∈ I t , t ∈ T, i.e., {g i t (x i t ; σ i )} t∈T ∈ R i [σ i ,x i t ], for all i t ∈ I t , t ∈ T. We can prove this in the similar way as that for statements (1) and (2).
Suppose the CP uses a global rule β i = β , for all i ∈ I, with ε i (t) =x i t , for all i t ∈ I t , t ∈ T, which produces a sequence of posted price r =< r 0 , . . . , r T >. Then, the mechanism is PBNE-HI if and only if {g i t (x i t ; σ i )} t∈T ∈ R i [σ i ,x i t ], or equivalently,
